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Basden v. Lee
290 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 2002)
L Facts
Sylvia White ("Sylvia") unsuccessfullytried to kill her husband, BillyWhite
("Billy"), for at least a year. First, she tried to poison him with wild berries and
poisonous plants. Then, she enlisted the help of Linwood Taylor ("Taylor"),
who was Ernest Basden's ("Basden") nephew. Taylor told Basden that he
needed a hit man and asked Basden if he wanted the job. Basden refused and
told Taylor the idea was crazy. Later, however, Basden ran into financial difficul-
ties. He approached Taylor and said he would agree to kill Billy.'
Taylor concocted a plan to lure Billy, an insurance salesman, to a spot where
Basden could kill Billy. Taylor pretended to be a wealthy businessman from out
of town who wanted to buyinsurance for propertyhe recentlypurchased. Taylor
arranged to meet Billyin a wooded rural area at 8:30 p.m. on Sunday, January20,
1992. That Sunday, Taylor and Basden waited for Billy at the designated spot.
When Billy arrived, Taylor, using the alias Tn Connors, introduced himself to
Billy while Basden waited in the car. Taylor told Billy he needed to use the
bathroom and stepped to the other side of the road. Basden got out of the car
and picked up a twelve-gauge shotgun he had placed on the ground by the car.
Basden aimed at Billy and pulled the trigger, but because he forgot to cock the
hammer, the shotgun did not fire. Basden then cocked the hammer and fired;
this time he knocked Billy to the ground. Basden loaded another shell into the
shotgun and approached Billy, who was lying face-up on the ground. Basden
stood over Billyand shot him again. A pathologist testified at trial that Billy bled
to death from massive shotgun wounds to the chest and abdomen. The patholo-
gist also testified that even though the aorta was nearly severed from the heart,
Billydid not die instantly, and that Billywould have remained conscious for some
time and felt pain.2
After the shooting, Basden and Taylor drove back to Taylor's house. Taylor
thought he left a map at the crime scene, so they returned there and, in the
process, also took a blank check, wallet, and gold ring from Billy's pockets. They
then returned to Taylor's house, went to the backyard, and burned all their
dothing. They also sawed the shotgun into several pieces, put the pieces into a
bucket of cement, and threw the bucket over a bridge into the Neuse River.
Taylor then gave Basden three-hundred dollars.'
1. State v. Basden, 451 S.E2d 238, 241 (N.C 1994).
2. Id at 241-42.
3. Id at 242.
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Police officers retrieved the metal base portions of two spent shotgun shells
from the ashes of the fire in Taylor's backyard. Forensic tests indicated that the
recovered shells were consistent with twelve-gauge shotgun shells and that they
could have been fired from the same weapon. Officers also went to Basden's
repair shop and retrieved a man's gold-tone ring from his pocket
On February 12, 1992, police arrested Taylor and Sylvia. Basden went to
the Sheriff's Department and Taylor told Basden that he confessed. He advised
Basden to turn himself in. Basden then gave some preliminary background
information to the police officers before telling them that he shot Billy. The
officers immediately read Basden his Mir a rights and Basden signed a written
waiver of his rights. Basden gave a detailed confession in which he stated that
he killed Billy because he needed the money.'
At trial, Basden presented evidence that he suffered from depression,
arthritis, kidney problems, pancreatitis, and drug and alcohol abuse. He stated
that he was extremelydose to his mother, who was killed in a car accident when
he was fourteen years old, and that he never fully recovered from her death. A
psychologist also testified that Basden had a dependent personality disorder,
which meant that he lacked self-confidence. Basden would cling to stronger
people and perform unpleasant tasks to retain their support. The psychologist
further testified that Basden had an avoidance personalitydisorder and a schizo-
typal personality disorder.6
The State of North Carolina established the details of the crime through the
testimony of police officers and through cross-examination of Basden. Two
officers testified to the contents of several detailed confessions byBasden and
Taylor. Basden himself, through cross-examination, admitted that he was the
person who shot Billy White, that he agreed to do it on the Friday before the
Sunday shooting, and that he did it for money.7
The jury found Basden guilty and then deliberated for nine hours on
sentencing. The jury found one aggravating factor, two statutory mitigating
factors, and five nonstatutorymitigating factors. The juryrecommended a death
sentence and the trial judge subsequently sentenced Basden to death. Basden
appealed his convictions and sentence to the Supreme Court of North Carolina;
the court affirmed the verdict. The United States Supreme Court denied certio-
rari.s
Basden then filed a Motion for Appropriate Relief, which the state post-
conviction court denied. Basden eventually won an order for post-conviction
discovery in 1999. Basden then found that a number of documents, including




7. Basden v. Lee, 290 F.3d 602,607-08 (4th Cr. 2002).
8. Id at 608.
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Jones ("Jones"), described the facts concerning Billy's death and the plan to kill
him. Basden filed an amended Motion for Appropriate Relief, but the state post-
conviction court rejected his motion. The Supreme Court of North Carolina and
the United States Supreme Court denied review. Basden then filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina. The court rejected some of Basden's claims as
procedurallydefaulted and found the remaining claims meritless. The court also
refused to grant Basden an evidentiary hearing. Basden filed an appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cxrcit and raised several claims
of due process violations.'
II. Hddig
The Fourth Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court's denial of all
habeas relief. The court affirmed because it held that: (1) no reasonable proba-
bility existed that prior disclosure of allegedlyinculpatozymaterials, even assum-
ing that the State actually withheld them, would have resulted in a different
outcome during the guilt or sentencing phase; (2) the State court made reasonable
findings that the State did not present false testimony in bad faith and did not
destroy evidence; and (3) Basden could not sufficiently overcome procedural
default of his ineffective assistance of counsel claimsW0
III A mbsis
A. False Tsnmy m Bad Faib anr DEn 5t4= qtE idar
Basden argued that the State denied him due process by. (1) knowingly
offering or failing to correct false testimony; and (2) destroying evidence that
might have assisted his defense. 2
1. False Tatinmy
Basden asserted that the State violated his due process rights bypresenting
the testimony of Special Agent Smith ("Agent Smith"), who testified at trial,
under oath, that he did not know Jones. 3 Post-conviction discovery actually
showed that Smith not only knew Jones, but that he knew him as a police
informant and that he met with Jones more than once while investigating Billy's
9. Id
10. Id at 608-19. The ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not further discussed in this
note.
11. Id at 614.
12. Id at 615.
13. Bzd 290 F.3d at 614.
2002]
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murder.4 Basden alleged that the State knowinglyoffered or failed to correct the
false testimony."5
The Fourth Circuit found that the state post-conviction court had assumed,
in making its decision, that Agent Smith's testimony was false. 6 The state court
did not find that Agent Smith's testimony was material because the jury did not
hear the testimony, Agent Smith's credibilitywas not an issue at trial, and Basden
confessed before trial and in court.17 For these reasons, the court rejected
Basden's claim."i
2 Detnmvim jETien
Basden argued that the State denied him due process under A r/zo v
Yaa /xL 9 by destroying evidence that might have assisted his defense. °
Basden alleged that the State violated two state court orders bydestroying certain
evidence that included handwritten notes of police interviews, tapes of conversa-
tions, and a map drawn byBasden.2 The state post-conviction court rejected
Basden's Yo cd claim on the merits alone.2
The Fourth Circuit first rejected Basden's asserted evidence of bad faith that
the State violated state court orders. The state post-conviction court ruled that
the State did not violate court orders, and the Fourth Grcuit found no authority
to review the state law ruling.24 The Fourth Crcuit also did not find the bad faith
necessary for a Yavmgoaa claim." The court considered Agent Smith's testi-
mony, assuming it to be false, irrelevant for establishing "bad faith in the destruc-
tion of the largelyunrelated evidence" on which Basden relied because only one
item, a taped conversation between Jones and Taylor, "was even tangentially
14. Id
15. Id; see Napue v. Illinois, 360 US. 264, 269 (1959) (holding that conviction obtained
through State's knowing use of false evidence violates due process under Fourteenth Amendment).
Agent Smith and the prosecutors actuallyasserted in an affidavit that the court reporter incorrectly
transcribed the name "Tm Jones," and that Agent Smith actually was asked if he knew "Tun
Conners," the phony name Taylor used in luring Billyto the murder scene. Bzd&, 290 F.3d at 614.
Defense counsel asserted that the trial transcript was correct. &ab 290 F.3d at 614.
16. Bazder 290 F.3d at 614.
17. Id
18. Id
19. 488 US. 51 (1988).
20. Basd, 290 F.3d at 615; seeArizona v. Youngblood, 488 US. 51,58 (1988) (holding that
criminal defendant may prove denial of due process by showing that police failed to preserve
potentially useful evidence in bad faith).







related to the subject of Agent Smith's assertedly false testimony." 6 The court
also found that most of the destroyed evidence was "memorialized" in written
summaries and that a written description of the taped conversation still
survived 7 Furthermore, the state court ruled that almost all of the alleged
destruction complied with state law and police procedures."8 Because Basden
failed to challenge those rulings or the constitutionality of the underlying state
laws and police procedures, the Fourth Circuit found no bad faith and no reason
to find error in the state court's rejection of Basden's Ycwgkxr clairm" 9
B. Te Brady M
The Fourth Ciruit divided Basden's challenge to the outcome into two
parts: (1) a challenge to the conviction; and (2) a challenge to the sentence.
1. ce to th Gciai
Basden argued that, under Brady v Ma)Ia4" the State violated his due
process rights bysuppressing the documents found during the 1999 post-convic-
tion discovery. Basden specifically referred to seven documents: (1) a state-
ment byJones, who was a confidential informant for the police; (2) a report of
surveillance activities involving Jones; (3) a "snitch" file containing a long list of
informant contacts between the police and Taylor onlya few months before the
murder, (4) a polygraph document and statement from Taylor dated February 12,
1992; and statements made by Taylor to the police dated (5) June 10, 1992, (6)
June 26,1992, and (7) June 30,1992.2 The Jones documents revealed that Jones
was a police informant who was also solicited by Taylor to kill Billy, that Taylor
approachedJones shortlyafter the murder, that he confessed without mentioning
Basden, that he killed Billy for twentythousand dollars and a van, and that he
detailed the entire storyof luring Billyto his murder." The "snitch" file reflected
Taylor's extensive work as a confidential informant for the police in the months
preceding the murder. 4 The Taylor statements contained much of the same
26. Id
27. BadE, 290 F.3d at 615.
28. Id
29. Id. at 615-16.
30. 373 US. 83 (1963).
31. B&du, 290 F3d at 609; seBradyv. MaryLad, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963) (holding that
State violates defendant's due process rights when it fails to disclose to defendant, prior to trial,
evidence favorable to accused); se also Strickler v. Greene, 527 US. 263, 280 (1999) (stating that
suppression of evidence is material and violates due process if reasonable probability exists that
different result would have occurred if prosecution disclosed such evidence to defendant before





information as the two other Taylor confessions the prosecution provided to
Basden on the first morning of trial, but the undisclosed statements also con-
tained more details about Taylor's plot with Sylvia and an acknowledgment by
Taylor that he lied about some facts in another of the undisclosed statements."
When defense counsel received the Jones documents, they located Jones, who
attested that Taylor dominated Basden and that Basden "was not himself" at the
time of Billy's murder 
6
Basden argued that he never would have taken the stand at trial and con-
fessed to the murder if he had timelyreceived the undisclosed Taylor and Jones
documents. 7 The court, however, found that none of the undisclosed docu-
ments affected the adnissibilityof Basden's pretrial confession. The court also
found that the State presented "overwhelming evidence of his guilt," based on
Basden's pretrial confession, its consistency with the Taylor confessions which
the State disclosed to Basden, and Basden's possession of Billy's ring. 9 Basden
also argued that the state post-conviction court's decision was an unreasonable
application of Brady and its progeny.' The court found that the state post-
conviction court's ruling was not unreasonable because Basden did not showthat
there was a reasonable probabilitythat "either his conviction or sentence would
have been different had the suppressed material been disclosed."4 The court,
therefore, found that Basden's Brady challenge to his conviction could not
succeed.42
2. C(l e to thSenzWxv
The State argued that Brady could not be applied to Basden's sentencing.4'
The Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected this argument because the United States
Supreme Court clearlystated, including in Brady itself, that Bradjs holding applies
35. Id The Fourth Crcuit also stated that it was troubled by the State's failure to provide
Basden with anyof the Taylor confessions until the first morning of trial. Id at 613 n.4. The court
stated that it considered this untimeliness in reviewing Basden's arguments on prejudice. Id
36. Id at 609.
37. Id at 610.
38. Bzder; 290 F.3d at 610; see Boggs v. Bait, 892 F.2d 1193, 1198-99 (4th ar. 1989)
(discussing level of intoxication or drug inducement necessary to determine if confession is
voluntary). Basden stated in a post-conviction affidavit that he smoked marijuana the morning of
his confession, but the Fourth .rcuit relied on the police officers' testimonies that Basden did not
appear to be under the influence, and on the fact that Basden did not claim that marijuana affected
his judgment, to find that the state court was not unreasonable in its conclusions. Basden, 290 F3d
at 610.
39. Bade 290 F3d at 610.
40. Id at 609; see28 U.S.C S 2254(d) (2000) (stating that federal court maynot grant writ of
habeas corpus involving decision of state court unless adjudication on merits was contrary to or
involved unreasonable application of federal law as determined by United States Supreme Court).
41. Bzder; 290 F.3d at 609.
42. Id at 610.
43. Id at 610-11.
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to both the penaltyphase and the guilt phase of trial.44 The court then stated that
it would consider the cumulative effect of the undisclosed documents "'collec-
tively, not item by iten.'
4s
Basden argued that he could have presented the sentencing jurywith a more
powerful argument identifying Sylvia as the most culpable party, Taylor next in
the hierarchy, and Basden as the "mentally ill, clinically depressed, intoxdcated,
manipulated, [sic] rube."' The state court rejected Basden's claim on the same
gound that it rejected his Brady attack on his conviction.4  The Fourth Grcuit
foud that the undisclosed documents could support Basden's theoryregarding
the jury's finding of culpability." The court, however, also found that Basden
knew almost all of the details available in the asserted Brady materials, that he
presented most of those details to the jury, and that even a more powerful
argument regarding culpabilitywould not have affected the State's argument that
Billy died because Basden "[wa]s willing to take the money."49 The court con-
cluded, therefore, that it could not grant a writ of habeas corpus because it did
not find the state post-conviction court's conclusion to be an unreasonable
application of the Brady test for materiality.'
IV. Applaaiw in Vugia
A. Ca&& 0BradyMatir
Prosecutors may argue that Brady does not apply at the penalty phase of
trial" When prosecutors make this argument, defense counsel should always be
prepared to assert that Brady and its progeny firmly establish its applicability to
the penalty phase. All Brady motions, therefore, should explicitly state whether
the material sought is for the guilt or penaltyphase of trial. At the penaltyphase,
44. Id at 611; see Brad 373 US. at 87 (holding that "the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to gil ortopuisbnve (emphasis added)); seahso Giles v. Maryland, 386 US. 66, 74 (1967)
(finding that trial court's denial of defense's motion to produce police reports during post-convic-
tion proceeding justified remand for reconsideration); StridLer, 527 U.S. at 296 (applying Brady test
to conviction and sentencing phase).
45. Badzk, 290 F.3d at 611 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,436 (1995)).
46. Id at 612.
47. Seid at 610 (finding that Basden had not shown reasonable probabilitythat result would
have been different if prosecutors timely disclosed suppressed materials).
48. Id at 612-13.
49. Id at 613-14. The State also argued that Brady could not be applied to Basden's sentenc-
ing. Id at 610-11. The Fourth Circuit found that the United States Supreme Court in Brady
expressly stated that its holding also applied at the punishment phase. Id at 611; seea soStide, 527
U.S. at 296 (applying Bmadytest to conviction and sentencing phase). The Fourth Circuit then stated
that it would consider the cumulative effect of the undisclosed documents collectively rather than
item byitem. Basde, 290 F.3d at 611.
50. Bazde, 290 F.3d at 613.
51. Se id at 610-11; s"pa Part m.LB.2 (discussing court's rejection of State's argument that
Brdy is not applicable to sentencing hearing).
20021
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exculpatory evidence can be very important to establishing mitigation evidence.
Defense counsel must assert that the Commonwealth is required to produce any
favorable evidence it or its agencies have.s" Counsel must also emphasize that
the prosecutor does not need to be aware of the existence or exculpatory nature
of the evidence to require disclosure.'3
B. PaiwalDefault
Defense counsel should take all steps necessary to avoid any procedural
default of Brady claims by showing diligence in obtaining Brady material. 4
Defense counsel can guard against procedural default bysending a simple request
for all exculpatory evidence to any agency of the prosecution that may be in-
volved. The court clerk should also receive a courtesyfile regarding the requests.
Although the requests may not immediately produce exculpatory evidence,
defense counsel can avoid procedural default of any potential Brady claims.
V. QCCU ibn
Defense counsel should be aware that Brady applies at both the guilt and
penaltyphases at trial. All Braymotions should state specificallyto which phase
the motions apply. Defense counsel also needs to identify all potential agencies
of the prosecution that have even the slightest possibilityof possessing exculpa-
tory evidence. Defense attorneys are strongly urged to contact the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse for Brady motions.
Philip I-I Yoon
52. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (holding that promise made to
defendant by different attorney from prosecutor's office was attributable to government because
prosecutor's office was agency of government).
53. SeeStri/k, 527 U.S. at 280-81 (finding that prosecutor has dutyto learn of anyfavorable
evidence known to others acting on government's behalf in particular case). As an example, an
agencyof the government maypossess evidence of a defendant's good behaviorduring a prior term
of incarceration. This evidence could act as a mitigating factor because it may show that the
defendant responds well to confinement and an isolated, regimented lifestyle. SeeSkipper v. South
Carolina, 476 US. 1, 8 (1986) (holding that exclusion of evidence of defendant's positive response
to prior incarceration was reversible error because evidence was relevant to future behavior in
prison and may have affected jury's decision to impose sentence of death).
54. SerWilliams v. Taylor, 529 US. 420,435 (2000) (holding that defendant must show due
diligence in discover potential Brady evidence); se also Stri&er, 527 US. at 279 (stating that
United States Court of Appeals found that Strickler's Brady claims were procedurally defaulted
because factual basis for claim was available to him when he filed state habeas petition). The Fourth
Crcuit opinion was unpublished, but the per curiam opinion can be found on the electronic
databases. Strickler v. Pruett, No. CA-95-924-3, 1998 WL 340420, at *1 (4th Gr. June 17,1998).
[Vol. 15:1
